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Abstract 
This article examines how individual differences in cognitive motivation and positive 
affect influence the outcome in integrative dyadic negotiations. The cognitive 
motivation and positive affect of 64 participants were measured prior to a simulated 
negotiation. At the individual level, high cognitive motivation strongly improved the 
outcome for the sellers, but not for the buyers. When cognitive motivation was low, 
positive affect enhanced the quality of the outcome for the sellers. The dyadic 
outcome was positively affected by both the individual difference variables. Cognitive 
motivation was more important than positive affect, and characteristics of the sellers 
were more important than those of the buyers. 
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Thinking Deep and Feeling Good: 
Cognitive Motivation and Positive Affect in Negotiation 
It is difficult to reach high quality agreements in negotiations. The task is 
complex and challenging, and cognitive biases and competitive processes often hinder 
the achievement of joint gains. The purpose of this article is to explore how intrinsic 
cognitive motivation and positive affective state can help negotiators to overcome the 
barriers to successful outcomes in negotiations. Intrinsic cognitive motivation, or need 
for cognition, is a stable individual difference in the tendency to engage in effortful 
and analytical thinking (Chatterjee, Heath, Milberg, & France, 2000). High cognitive 
motivation is likely to help negotiators to overcome cognitive biases and thereby to 
discover the integrative potential. However, despite its potential importance, cognitive 
motivation has not been directly examined in negotiation research. Positive affect, 
that is genuine positive subjective feelings and moods (Russel & Carroll, 1999), may 
help negotiators by hindering competitive processes and trigger joyful task 
involvement and cooperation. Positive affect is found to impact numerous social 
phenomena (Forgas & George, 2001), but is relatively seldom investigated in 
negotiations (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000). Furthermore, in 
negotiation research affective state is typically externally induced through 
manipulations. Here we focus on naturally occurring differences in aroused positive 
affect. 
Although intrinsic cognitive motivation and affective state vary in degree of 
stability, they both point towards individual differences as explanatory factors in 
negotiation research. In the last decades there has been pessimism about the effects of 
individual differences on negotiations (Neale & Bazerman, 1991). This is largely due 
to inconsistent findings (Rubin & Brown, 1975) and to the use of broad personality 
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variables (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Recently, however, more specific and maybe 
more relevant individual difference variables such as social value orientation 
(Olekalns & Smith, 1999) and cognitive closure (de Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999) 
have been found to impact negotiations. In this article we suggest that both trait 
(intrinsic cognitive motivation) and state (positive affect) influence negotiations. In 
exploring the effects of cognitive motivation and positive affect on negotiations we 
have to deal with several issues. First, we must examine how these individual level 
variables affect the individual level outcome. Second, we must explore the forms in 
which individual level variables transform to dyadic level outcomes. Third, we must 
examine whether positive affect and cognitive motivation interact in explaining 
outcome. We address these issues by first discussing cognitive motivation, then 
affective states, and finally their interrelationship. 
Cognitive Motivation 
Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis (1996) show that people differ in their 
tendencies to enjoy and engage themselves effortfully in cognitive activities. 
Cognitive motivation is only modestly (positively) related to intelligence, and 
therefore expresses a motivation to apply the mind rather than having an intellectual 
ability as such. Intrinsic cognitive motivation, as measured by the “need for cognition 
scale” (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), has consistently been found to influence 
problem-solving activities. Individuals with low cognitive motivation have a tendency 
to rely on simple information cues and to use cognitive heuristics (Cacioppo et al., 
1996). They are also easily stressed by complex cognitive tasks (Gulgos, 2001). High 
cognitive motivation lead individuals to actively seek out and use new and relevant 
information. They are therefore more effective decision makers in badly structured 
tasks than individuals with low cognitive motivation (Nair & Ramnarayan, 2000). 
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Furthermore, framing biases in decision-making are found mostly among individuals 
with low cognitive motivation (Chatterjee et al., 2000; Smith & Levin, 1996).  
Cognitive biases have consistently been found to influence the negotiation 
performance (Thompson, 1998). The use of cognitive heuristics leads to predictable 
mistakes in negotiations (Bazerman et al., 2000).  Framing and anchoring effects, zero 
sum perceptions, the use of only easily available information, and other barriers to 
effective negotiations may be overcome by individuals high on cognitive motivation. 
Their enjoyment of challenging cognitive tasks, their willingness to seek out new and 
relevant information, and their systematic information processing (Cacioppo et al., 
1996) may help them to identify joint gains. Thus, we expect high cognitive 
motivation to result in effective outcomes. We expect this to hold both for the 
individuals’ own results and for the dyadic outcome. 
Most cognitive research on negotiation has focused on how biases negatively 
affect the outcomes in negotiation (Bazerman et al., 2000). Little effort has been made 
to find more fundamental individual differences that influence the tendency to be 
burdened by biases. The relevance of dispositional differences in cognition in 
negotiation has, however, recently been demonstrated by de Dreu et al. (1999). They 
found individuals high on need for cognitive closure to be heavily influenced by 
salient focal points and stereotypical information when making concessions and 
setting limits. The need for cognitive closure implies impatience and an energetic 
search for structure and solutions. The need for closure is negatively but weakly 
correlated (r = -.26) with cognitive motivation (Cacioppo et al., 1996). The effects on 
the negotiation outcomes may, nevertheless, be similar but opposite. de Dreu et al. 
(1999) did, however, not examine outcome. They focused on individual level 
cognitive and behavioral variables.  
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The effects of cognitive motivation on performance have also typically been 
studied with the individual as the unit of analysis. However, a study of dyadic 
decision-making (Shestowsky, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1998) suggests that those 
highest on intrinsic cognitive motivation influence the process and the outcome the 
most. When moving from the individual to the dyadic level we encounter several 
challenges in exploring whether and how individual level variables influence the 
dyadic result. A number of potential aggregation effects are possible (Malter & 
Dickson, 2001). For example, it may be sufficient that one member of the dyad is 
highly cognitively motivated (“best member”) in order for the dyad to discover the 
integrative potential. Alternatively, simple additive models are possible (i.e., “the 
more the better”), or there may be interaction effects between the characteristics of the 
two negotiators. We will explore different forms of aggregation when we test the 
following general hypothesis:   
H1: High cognitive motivation enhances the quality of outcomes in integrative 
negotiations 
Positive Affect 
Positive affect has received growing attention in organizational behavior research and 
has been found to impact both behavior and outcome across a variety of situations 
(Isen & Baron, 1991). Fairly mild nonspecific experiences of feeling good have been 
found to help decision-makers to more efficient decision processes (Isen & Means, 
1983) and more creative problem solving (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). Isen & 
Baron summarize the research by stating that “persons who are feeling happy are 
more cognitively flexible--more able to make associations, to see potential relations 
among stimuli--than are persons in a neutral state” (1991, p. 21). According to the 
affect infusion model (Forgas, 1995) affect is particularly influential when substantive 
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cognitive tasks are performed. Such tasks are characterized by the need to actively 
link information elements in new and creative ways. This is a defining characteristic 
of integrative negotiation tasks, and affect is therefore of critical importance in 
negotiations (Forgas & George, 2001). 
The affective infusion model predicts that mild positive mood states influence 
the planning and execution of negotiation encounters. Positive mood is expected to 
selectively prime positive thoughts and associations, and thereby lead to the use of 
more cooperative negotiation strategies. In a series of experiments, Forgas (1998) 
found support for this prediction. Participants in a positive mood formulated action 
plans that were more cooperative and integrative, and achieved agreements of higher 
quality than did neutral or negative mood participants. Positive affect produced 
successful outcomes by triggering a favourable impression of the negotiation task, and 
thereby generating a cooperative process. Other studies on positive affect in 
integrative negotiation support this reasoning. Negotiators in a good mood are found 
to be less competitive than others (Baron, 1991), to reduce the use of contentious 
tactics, and to reach more integrative outcomes (Carnevale & Isen, 1986).  
Positive affect may arise from different sources. Previous research has mainly 
examined the effects of externally induced positive mood, that is, positive affect has 
been triggered by showing cartoons and by giving gifts (Carnevale & Isen, 1986), by 
using pleasant scents (Baron, 1990), and by manipulations of feedback on previous 
tasks (Forgas, 1998). In the current study we want to extend this research and examine 
the effects of natural occurring variations in positive affect. If natural variations in 
mood have an effect, it will reinforce previous studies where positive moods are 
artificially induced. While the causes and stability of affect vary, we expect mood 
effects to be similar whether it is triggered by cues, natural state or stable trait. The 
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results of Rhoades, Arnold, & Jay (2001) suggest for example that affective state and 
trait have similar effects and that state mediates between trait and conflict behavior.  
In the psychological literature on affect there is a debate on the dimensionality 
of the construct (e.g., Russel & Carroll, 1999), where one discusses the importance of 
the degree of arousal (“hot” versus “cold” emotions). Aroused positive affect (e.g., 
enthusiasm) may in its effects on negotiation differ from positive affect with low 
arousal (e.g., happy). By using natural mood and a paper and pencil test, we may be 
more precise than previous studies on the arousal aspect of positive mood. Given the 
fact that emotions were manipulated rather than measured in most prior studies, we do 
not know whether the participants were positively aroused or more relaxed satisfied. 
Positive affect may need to have a component of high activity and energy related to it 
(Caliguri, Jacobs, & Farr, 2000) in order to have an effect in task-related interpersonal 
encounters such as negotiations. We therefore examine the effects of aroused positive 
affect.  
Most research on positive affect has focused on the individual level of analysis 
(Isen & Baron, 1991). However, George (1990) has proposed that groups often 
develop a group affective tone. In order to examine how aroused positive affect 
impacts the dyadic outcome, we want to explore different kinds of aggregations, 
including using average scores and the score of the member with the highest positive 
affect. We suggest the following general hypothesis: 
H2: Positive affect enhances the quality of outcomes in integrative negotiations 
Cognitive Motivation and Positive Affect 
Above we have proposed that trait (i.e., cognitive motivation), and state (i.e., 
positive affect) both influence outcomes in negotiations. The two factors may also 
interplay in explaining outcomes. We find it reasonable to frame the discussion of 
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possible interaction effects in terms of the temporal stability of the two factors. Thus, 
the question is whether the effects of positive affect depend on the level of cognitive 
motivation. Who is helped the most by positive affect, those that are high or those that 
are low on cognitive motivation?  
Individuals high in cognitive motivation are naturally inclined to involve 
themselves eagerly and constructively in complex negotiation tasks. They may not 
need positive affect, or respond to it, as a triggering mechanism for their constructive 
task involvement. The pre-existing trait will dominate their cognitive and behavioral 
activities. Individuals low on cognitive motivation do not lack the intellectual ability 
to solve complex tasks, neither do they lack the ability to apply themselves (Cacioppo 
et al., 1996). They may, however, need an alternative mechanism than cognitive 
motivation, to trigger energetic cognitive and behavioral involvement. Aroused 
positive affect may serve as such a mechanism. Therefore, we put forward the 
following hypothesis: 
H3: The positive relationship between positive affect and the quality of outcome in 
integrative dyadic negotiation is strongest when cognitive motivation is low 
Method 
Participants and Procedures 
We used 64 business students enrolled in negotiation courses as participants in 
the study. Their average age was 25 years, and women comprised 42 % of the sample. 
We conducted negotiation simulations during the first meeting of the classes. A seller 
and a buyer negotiated the delivery of television sets (cf. Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). They 
negotiated three issues, and each issue had nine alternative settlement points. The 
payoff matrix is shown in Appendix A. We chose this simulation because it is a 
commonly used variable-sum negotiation that allows for integrative agreements 
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through logrolling. The parties can achieve high quality agreements by exchanging 
concessions on their low-profit issues (date of delivery for the seller and financing 
terms for the buyer).  
Prior to the negotiation exercise, the students were asked to answer a 
questionnaire containing several measures, including measures of cognitive 
motivation and affect. Then the negotiation exercise started. Each student received 
confidential background information and a profit schedule that showed their 
individual earnings associated with the different possible alternatives. The subjects 
had 10 minutes for preparation before they were randomly assigned to dyads (a seller 
and a buyer) and led to separate rooms. The dyads were given 30 minutes to 
negotiate. Finally, the students were debriefed.       
Measurement and Validation 
Outcome. At the individual level, outcome was measured as the total profit 
achieved by the negotiator across the three issues. For example, if the negotiators in a 
dyad agreed on alternative E on all three issues (see Appendix A), each negotiator 
would receive an individual outcome of 4000. The individual outcomes for a seller 
and a buyer in a dyad were not independent of each other (intraclass correlation = -
.41). Therefore, we analysed the individual outcomes for the sellers and the buyers 
separately. At the dyadic level, the negotiators’ joint outcome was measured as the 
sum of the individual outcomes achieved by a seller and a buyer in a dyad. Thus, if 
the negotiators as suggested above agreed on alternative E on all issues, their joint 
outcome, or joint sum, would be 8000. In fully integrative agreements (e.g., AEI), the 
joint sum is 10400.1  
Cognitive motivation. We measured a negotiator’s intrinsic cognitive 
motivation with eight questions adapted from the short version of the ”need for 
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cognition scale” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). The scale consisted of statements such as 
“I prefer complex rather than simple problems”, “I enjoy having responsibility for 
situations that require a lot of thinking”, and “I appreciate tasks which imply finding 
new solutions to problems”. Higher scores reflected higher cognitive motivation. The 
coefficient alpha for this scale was .79. We recoded the variable so that it was centred 
on zero, in order to reduce multicollinearity when main effects and interaction effects 
were analysed. To analyse cognitive motivation at the dyadic level, we examined 
buyer and seller scores, the average score across seller and buyer, and the value of the 
member with the highest score. 
Positive Affect. We measured a negotiator’s positive affective state using items 
from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988) and Russel (1980). On these scales, participants are asked to indicate how they 
feel (1 = not at all, 5 = extremely). We had four positive affect items; enthusiastic, 
excited, elated and clutched up. These items were chosen because they have an 
element of positive arousal, which seems more relevant in negotiation situations than 
low aroused positive affect items such as happy, glad and satisfied. The coefficient 
alpha was .73. We recoded the variable so that it was centred on zero. Similar to 
cognitive motivation, we examined the buyers and the sellers scores, the average 
score across the sellers and the buyers, and the value of the member with the highest 
score, to indicate positive affect at the dyadic level.  
Results 
 Means, standard deviations and correlations for the study variables are 
displayed in Table 1. The correlation matrix shows that cognitive motivation is 
significantly positively related to the outcomes at both the individual level (r = .32) 
and the dyadic level (r = .52). Positive affect is marginally significantly positively 
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related to the outcome at the dyadic level (r = .35). The low correlation (r = .17) 
between positive affect and cognitive motivation indicates that they are independent 
constructs. 
Individual Outcome. We first analysed how cognitive motivation and positive 
affect influenced the individual outcome. The individual outcomes of the sellers and 
the buyers were analysed separately because of the dependency between the 
individual scores in a dyad. We used hierarchical moderated regression analyses to 
test the hypotheses at the individual level. Cognitive motivation and positive affect 
were entered in Step 1, and the interaction term in Step 2. The results are presented in 
Table 2.  
 For the sellers, model 1 reached statistical significance, F(2, 29) = 6.64, p < 
.01, R2 = .31. Cognitive motivation had a significant positive affect on the individual 
outcome (β = .55), while positive affect did not impact the individual outcome (β = 
.05). By adding the product term in Step 2, a marginal significant negative interaction 
term was found (β = -.33). Positive affect was most important for the outcome when 
cognitive motivation was low. For the buyers, Model 1 did not reach statistical 
significance, neither did Model 2 with the interaction term, F-values = 0.02, ns.2,3 
At the individual level, the results for the sellers support Hypothesis 1 
(cognitive motivation enhances the quality of the outcomes), but not Hypothesis 2 
(positive affect enhances the quality of the outcomes). Hypothesis 3 (positive affect is 
more important when cognitive motivation is low) receives marginally support. The 
results for the buyers do not support any of the hypotheses.  
Dyadic Outcome. We used hierarchical moderated regression analyses to test 
how cognitive motivation and positive affect impacted the dyadic outcome. First, we 
examined how the dyadic outcome depended on the cognitive motivation of the 
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sellers and the cognitive motivation of the buyers (entered in Step 1), and the 
interaction of their cognitive motivation (entered in Step 2). Then we used the same 
procedure to test the effects of positive affect. The results are shown in Table 3. 
 The cognitive motivation of the sellers and the buyers (Model 1) had a 
significant positive effect on the dyadic outcome, F(2, 28) = 7.01, p < .01, R2 = .33. 
The regression coefficients show that the significant model was caused by the 
cognitive motivation of the sellers (β = .57), and not by the cognitive motivation of 
the buyers (β = .02). The interaction term entered in Step 2 was significant (β = -.37). 
The buyers with high cognitive motivation were most important for the dyadic 
outcome when the sellers had low cognitive motivation, and vice versa.  
The positive affect of the sellers and the buyers (Model 1) did not impact the 
dyadic outcome significantly, F(2, 29) = 2.15, ns, though the sellers’ positive affect 
had a marginally significant positive effect (β = .34). The negative interaction of the 
sellers’ and the buyers’ positive affect was also marginal significant (β = -.35). Being 
positive was especially important for the dyadic outcome if the opponent was low on 
positive affect. 
In order to test Hypothesis 3 (interaction between cognitive motivation and 
positive affect) at the dyadic level, we ran another set of hierarchical moderated 
regression analyses. Cognitive motivation and positive affect were entered in Step 1, 
while the interaction of cognitive motivation and positive affect was entered in Step 2. 
The effects of cognitive motivation and positive affect were first examined using the 
average scores of the two members, and next using the maximum scores in each dyad. 
The results are summarized in Table 4. 
 By using average scores, Model 1 is significant, F(2, 29) = 6.21, p < .01, R2 = 
.30. Cognitive motivation is significantly positively related to the dyadic outcome (β 
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= .44). Positive affect is also positively related to the dyadic outcome (β = .24), but do 
not reach statistical significance. We found no significant interaction between 
cognitive motivation and positive affect (β = -.22), but the interaction point towards a 
substitution effect. By using maximum scores, Model 1 is again significant, F(2, 29) = 
10.37, p < .01, R2 = .42. Both cognitive motivation (β = .48) and positive affect (β = 
.32) have a positive significant affect on the dyadic outcome. We did not find a 
significant interaction term (β = -.15).  
At the dyadic level, the results support Hypothesis 1. Cognitive motivation 
enhances the dyadic outcome, but it is mainly the cognitive motivation of the sellers 
that count. High motivation among the buyers is only critical when the sellers have 
low motivation. Hypothesis 2 receives some support. Positive affect enhances the 
outcome when maximum score is used, and the positive affect of the sellers seems to 
be the driving force. Hypothesis 3 is not supported, as cognitive motivation and 
positive affect did not interact significantly. 
Discussion 
In this paper we have examined how cognitive motivation and positive affect 
influenced outcomes in dyadic integrative negotiations. In general, the results indicate 
that both variables are potent predictors of outcomes. Furthermore, the results also 
give some more specific insights into role-effects and aggregations. First we discuss 
the general effects, and then the more detailed findings. 
The most important result from our investigation is the strong positive effects 
of cognitive motivation on negotiation outcomes. Being the first study of cognitive 
motivation in negotiation, our findings leave promising news for future studies. We 
have found that cognitive motivation influenced both the individual level outcomes 
(for sellers) and the joint gains. In this study we have examined intrinsic cognitive 
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motivation, or need for cognition. This is a tendency to effortful engagement in 
cognitive activities and must be distinguished from intelligence. Previous research has 
shown that it helps decision makers’ overcome cognitive biases (e.g., Smith & Levin, 
1996) and it generates continuous attention, curiosity, objectivism and other problem 
solving advantages (for a review, see Cacioppo et al., 1996) that should facilitate for 
integrativeness in negotiations. The results indicate that cognitive motivation is a 
potent variable in negotiation research. 
Our research has been based on natural variations in intrinsic cognitive 
motivation. However, individuals high on cognitive motivation do not apply 
themselves effortfully to all tasks. The task must be stimulating and challenging. The 
results indicate that negotiation simulations are sufficiently stimulating to make need 
for cognition highly relevant. We expect that real life negotiations are even more 
likely to evoke effortful cognitive processes among those high in need for cognition. 
However, future research should examine what factors in negotiation situations that 
actually trigger cognitive efforts among those already high in intrinsic cognitive 
motivation. Perhaps educating individuals to perceive negotiations as a complex task 
with potentially creative non-obvious solutions will trigger cognitive efforts among 
those with high cognitive motivation. Furthermore, the strong effects of intrinsic 
cognitive motivation on outcomes reveal a need to find external cognitive motivators 
for individuals low on intrinsic motivation. It is probably a challenging task to trigger 
energetic problem solving among individuals low on need for cognition. Cacioppo et 
al. (1996) identify “personal relevance” as one situational factor that moderates 
between intrinsic cognitive motivation and effort. Situational variables studied in 
negotiation research, e.g. accountancy, may serve as a substitute for those low on 
cognitive motivation. 
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Further research on cognitive motivation should also examine the micro 
mediating process between cognitive motivation and negotiation outcomes. 
Psychological research on individual decision-making suggests that cognitive 
motivation works by removing cognitive biases and facilitate for cognitive 
playfulness. For practical purposes, selecting negotiators high on need for cognition 
and/or frame the situation as demanding may be as important as training negotiators 
to avoid cognitive biases.  
Our investigation showed that positive affect, although less so than cognitive 
motivation, increased gain in negotiations. This is not surprising given previous 
research and conceptualizations (Barry & Oliver, 1996). There are, however, two 
aspects of our research that warrant special attention: the focus on natural, rather than 
experimentally manipulated positive mood, and the aroused nature of the positive 
affect construct. First, previous research has shown fairly mild manipulations of affect 
to influence behavior and outcome in negotiations (e.g., Forgas, 1998). Research on 
conflict behavior in natural settings (Rhoades et al., 2001) has found positive affect to 
generate high concern for one-self and others. In our study we find that natural 
variations in affective state also influence outcome. Second, our affect construct can 
be defined as aroused positive affect. The positive affect construct presented by 
Rhoades et al. (2001) also had a high arousal connotation (e.g., enthusiastic, excited, 
determined). This suggests that positive affective “motivation” influences behavior 
and outcomes in conflicts and negotiations. In order to detect the importance of 
arousal, further research should examine whether the same effects are found for low 
arousal positive affect.  
Of the more detailed findings, the differential importance of the sellers and the 
buyers was an unexpected surprise. The seller’s cognitive motivation and positive 
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affect had positive effects on outcomes.  The affect and cognition of the buyers had 
low predictive power. Post hoc, we may speculate whether a “buyer is the king” norm 
influences the negotiation. The buyers may in fact let the sellers do all the work. 
Therefore, the characteristics of the sellers become more important for the outcome 
than those of the buyers. This line of reasoning is supported by a recent study on 
culture and negotiation (Drake, 2001). Role (seller or buyer) was found to be a better 
prediction of the fixed sum perceptions than culture. Furthermore, an explorative 
analysis showed that the sellers’ behavior influenced the buyers’ perception, but not 
vice versa. The buyers may perceive themselves as powerful and act distributively 
(Cai, Wilson, & Drake, 2000). The integrative gain must therefore come from 
innovative efforts from the sellers. The sellers are only able to improve their results 
by demonstrating that this does not hurt the buyers.  
Future research should explore role differences by examining process data at 
the role level of analysis. The role effects point, however, to a more general challenge 
regarding the effects of individual level variables in dyadic interactions. In our 
examination of joint outcome the model with the best fit was based on maximum 
scores (i.e., the member with the highest score on cognitive motivation and positive 
affect) rather than on averaging the individual scores. Thus, the effects of combination 
and distribution of individual characteristics should be investigated in future studies 
of dyadic negotiations.  
As always, it is necessary to be cautious when generalizing from experimental 
data on students. Furthermore, we lack process data to detect the micro mediating 
effects between individual level characteristics and outcomes at the dyadic level. 
Since we measured natural levels of affect, the ranges and effects may be lower than 
when strong manipulations are used. Furthermore, we did not manipulate situational 
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variables in this study. The inclusion of such variables could have helped us detecting 
the moderating and mediating effects between individual characteristics and 
outcomes. Nevertheless, the design allowed us to test for the effects of natural 
occurring individual differences on negotiation in a controlled setting. In this setting, 
cognitive motivation and positive affect were found to influence the quality of the 
outcome. Thus, thinking deep and feeling good may be powerful routes to success in 
negotiations.  
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Footnotes 
1 We also measured joint outcome as Pareto efficiency. Pareto efficiency 
relates the agreements to Pareto optimal solutions. We developed an index based on 
Tripp and Sondak (1992), where we measured the number of possible agreements that 
were superior to the solution chosen by each dyad. However, as the correlation 
between Pareto efficiency (reversed) and joint sum was very high, r = .91, we decided 
to use only one of the measures. We used joint outcome, as this is the most widely 
used measure in dyadic negotiations (Neale & Northcraft, 1991). 
2 We found no differences between the seller and the buyer in individual 
outcome, F(1, 62) = 0.17, ns, cognitive motivation, F(1, 61) = 0.67, ns, positive affect 
F(1, 62) = 0.41, ns, or in other variables as gender, age and experience. 
3 Furthermore, we also examined how individual outcome depended on the 
opponent’s cognitive motivation and positive affect, but no effects were found. 
  Cognition and Affect                   24
Appendix A 
 
Payoff Matrix 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
           Delivery time         Product variations       Financing terms 
______________________   ______________________   ______________________ 
Alternative   Buyer    Seller   Alternative  Buyer    Seller     Alternative   Buyer  Seller 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
0 weeks   4000     0        9       2400  0   24 weeks    1600        0 
1 week   3500   200        8       2100        300   18 weeks    1400      500 
2-3 weeks   3000   400        7       1800        600   12 weeks    1200     1000 
4-5 weeks   2500   600        6       1500        900    8 weeks     1000     1500 
6-7 weeks   2000   800        5       1200       1200    6-7 weeks    800     2000 
8-9 weeks   1500  1000        4        900        1500    4-5 weeks    600     2500 
10-11 weeks   1000  1200        3          600        1800    2-3 weeks    400     3000 
12-13 weeks     500  1400        2        300        2100    1 week         200     3500 
14 weeks       0  1600        1             0         2400    0 weeks   0      4000 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Negotiators saw only their own payoff matrix and were not allowed to exchange 
payoff matrixes.
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Tables 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                 Individual level        Dyadic level   
               __________________________________________ 
Variables     M        SD      M  SD          Outcome       CM     PA 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Outcome     4667       760     9334 817     0.32**    0.11       
Cognitive Motivation (CM)   3.47       0.58      3.47 0.45  0.52*** (0.79)     0.17 
Positive Affect (PA)    2.71       0.68      2.71 0.45  0.35*   0.27    (0.73) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Individual level correlations are shown above the diagonal, dyadic level correlations below. Coefficient alphas are shown in parentheses in 
the diagonal.  
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01.
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Table 2 
Regression Analyses on Individual Outcome 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
                               Individual Outcome 
                            _________________________________ 
Independent Variables    Step 1   Step 2 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Sellers         
Cognitive motivation    .55***     .49***
 Positive affect     .05     .21 
Cognitive motivation x Positive affect     -.31*     
R2      .31***     .39*** 
∆R2           .08* 
Buyers         
Cognitive motivation    -.03    -.05 
 Positive affect     -.02    -.03 
Cognitive motivation x Positive affect     -.05     
R2       .00      .00 
∆R2           .00 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. 
*  p < .10. *** p < .01. 
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Table 3 
Regression Analyses on Dyadic Outcome 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
                               Dyadic Outcome 
                            _________________________________ 
Independent Variables    Step 1   Step 2 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Cognitive motivation         
Sellers’ cognitive motivation   .57***     .60*** 
Buyers’ cognitive motivation   .02    -.13 
Sellers’ x Buyers’         -.37**     
R2      .33***     .45*** 
∆R2           .12** 
Positive affect         
Sellers’ positive affect   .34*     .39** 
Buyers’ positive affect   .17     .14 
Sellers’ x Buyers’         -.33*     
R2      .13     .23* 
∆R2           .10* 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. 
*  p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
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Table 4 
Regression Analyses on Dyadic Outcome for Average and Maximum Scores of 
Cognitive Motivation and Positive Affect 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
                               Dyadic Outcome 
                            _________________________________ 
Independent Variables    Step 1   Step 2 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Average scores       
Cognitive motivation    .44***     .36** 
Positive affect     .24     .20 
Cognitive motivation x Positive affect      -.22     
R2      .30***     .34*** 
∆R2           .04 
Maximum scores        
Cognitive motivation    .48***     .41**  
Positive affect     .32**     .31** 
Cognitive motivation x Positive affect      -.15     
R2      .42***     .43*** 
∆R2           .01 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Standardized beta coefficients are shown. 
** p < .05. *** p < .01. 
 
